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I. INTRODUCTION

Between the years 1974 and 1995, dramatic changes occurred in
West Virginia's law relating to "bad faith" insurance practices.' During this period, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed not only questions that had long remained unsettled, but also
newly emerging areas of insurance bad faith law. In late 1994, the
court suggested, in dicta, that it might consider a further expansion of
West Virginia law by creating a common law duty of good faith and

1. The use of the term "bad faith" to describe West Virginia's law regarding insurance settlement practices is something of a misnomer. As discussed more fully below, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has expressly rejected the concept of "bad
faith" as a substantive standard in key decisions concerning West Virginia's common law.
The term nevertheless continues to be widely used in West Virginia and elsewhere as a
shorthand designation encompassing the various rules governing insurer settlement conduct.
For convenience, this Article will employ the term "bad faith" in this general sense, but
will use more specific terms when discussing the actual content of the law in this area.
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fair dealing running from a liability insurer to a third party suing the
insurer's policyholder.2
At a time when the future of West Virginia's bad faith law is
under consideration, it is appropriate to take stock of the practical
ramifications of the groundbreaking decisions during the last twenty
years. Accordingly, this Article will examine some of these ramifications and discuss the need for clarification of certain issues in light of
recent developments. In addition, this Article will analyze the basis for
creating a common law duty running from insurers to third-party
claimants and assess whether creating such a duty would be consistent
with the goals that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has pursued over the last twenty years.
II. OVERVIEW OF FIRST-PARTY AND THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE

The fundamental distinction between first-party and third-party
insurance is well-recognized under West Virginia law.3 First-party insurance arises where an insurer contracts to reimburse an insured up to
the limits of the policy for damages suffered by the insured.4 Fire
insurance and automobile collision policies are among the most common types of first-party insurance that the West Virginia courts have
addressed.
In contrast, third-party insurance -

or liability insurance

-

does

not provide for reimbursement of the insured's own damages. Rather,
the insurer pays covered claims brought against the insured by a thirdparty claimant.5 Such third-party protection typically is provided by
commercial general liability insurance policies or automobile liability
policies. These liability policies extend two primary benefits to the
insured. First, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the insured for judg-

2. Charles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 452 S.E.2d 384, 389 (W. Va. 1994).
3. See, e.g., Weese v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying West Virginia law); Marshall v. Saseen, 450 S.E.2d 791, 797 (W. Va. 1994); Lee v.
Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345, 348 (W. Va. 1988). See generally DENNIS J. WALL, LTGATION
AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH §§ 3.01, 9.01 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the dis-

tinction between first-party and third-party insurance).
4. See Marshall 450 S.E.2d at 797; Lee, 373 S.E.2d at 348.
5. Weese, 879 F.2d at 120.
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ments or settlements up to the specified limit of the policy. Second,
the insurer undertakes to defend lawsuits brought against the insured
and to pay the cost of the defense. In connection with this duty to
defend, liability insurance policies generally vest the insurer with the
exclusive right to conduct the defense and/or settlement of claims
against the insured.6
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST VmGmNfA'S LAW OF INSURANCE BAD
FArrH BETWEEN 1974 AND 1995

In the early decades of the twentieth century, some states began to
address issues involving insurance settlement practices West Virginia
did not join this movement until the mid-1970s' However, in the ensuing twenty years, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
not only established basic rules of insurance bad faith law, but it did
so by adopting approaches that were novel - and, in some instances,
unique - among the states.' The development in West Virginia's law
of insurance settlement practices emerged from legislation as well as
three separate lines of cases.
First, in 1974, the West Virginia Legislature modified the Unfair
Trade Practices Act (UTPA) to prohibit certain claims settlement practices by insurers. ° Seven years later, West Virginia became one of a
handful of states to recognize a private cause of action under that statute by both the insured and the claimant." Second, in 1990, the Supreme Court of: Appeals of West Virginia adopted a unique hybrid
negligence-strict liability standard for third-party insurance cases where
the insured was held liable for a judgment in excess of policy limits. 12 Third, in 1986, West Virginia became the first jurisdiction to
adopt a strict liability standard for bad faith claims involving first-party

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 120-21.
See infra note
See discussion
See discussion
W. VA. CODE
See discussion
See discussion

71 and accompanying text.
infra Part I.A.
infra Parts III.A. to Il.C.
§§ 33-11-1 to -10 (1992).
infra Part I.A.
infra Part Ill.B.I.
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insurance. 3 Each of these three lines of development is examined in
greater detail below.
A. Statutory Bad Faith
1. The West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act
In 1974, the West Virginia Legislature amended the UTPA to add
additional provisions prohibiting fourteen separate "unfair claim settlement practices" ranging from failure to act promptly upon communications from insureds to failure to settle claims where liability had become reasonably clear. 4 These enactments were based on model leg13. See discussion infra Part mH.C.
14. These practices are set forth in W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1992) (providing:
Unfair claim settlement practices. - No person shall commit or perform
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the
following: (a) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to coverages at issue; (b) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably
promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance
policies; (c) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; (d) Refusing
to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all
available information; (e) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of loss statements have been completed; (f)
Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear, (g) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made
claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered;
(h) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application; (i)
Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured; (j) Making claims
payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a statement setting
forth the coverage under which payments are being made; (k) Making
known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards
in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to
accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration; (1) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim
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islation drafted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 5 Over forty other states also adopted these model statutes by legislation or regulation. 6
The stated purpose of the UTPA was "to regulate trade practices
in the business of insurance ...by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices in this State which constitute unfair
methods of competition or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined."' 7 The Insurance
Commissioner was given authority to enforce the UTPA. s If, after
notice and hearing, the Commissioner determined that the UTPA had
been violated, the Commissioner was granted the discretion to issue a
cease and desist order and require the payment of a penalty or revoke
the license of any company, broker, or agent who violated the Act. 9
In addition, penalties were established for the violation of cease and
desist orders.2"

report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss
forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the same information;
(m) Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; (n)
Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the
insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; (o) Failing to notify the
first party claimant and the provider(s) of services covered under accident
and sickness insurance and hospital and medical service corporation insurance
policies whether the claim has been accepted or denied and if denied, the
reasons therefor, within fifteen calendar days from the filing of the proof of
loss . . ).
15. See National Association of Insurance Commisioners, II Laws and Legislation
Committee Report, 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS 515

D (1960); STEPHEN S. ASHLEY,
(1994) [hereinafter ASHLEY]; PROPERTY

BAD FArrH: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES 40 app. II
INS. LAW COMM., TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, AM. BAR Assoc., BAD FAITH AND PuNmvE DAMAGES:
ANNOTATIONS TO FIRSTPARTY INSURANCE CASES, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS 329 (1986).
exhibit

16. See Stephen S. Ashley, The 1990 Amendments to the NAIC Model Unfair Trade
Practices Act, 7 BAD FAITH L. RPT. 213 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Amendments]; DENNIS J.
WALL, LITIGATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 3.25 (2d ed. 1994).
17. W. VA. CODE § 33-11-1 (1992).
18. W. VA. CODE §§ 33-11-6 to -8 (1992).
19. W. VA. CODE § 33-11-6 (1992).
20. W. VA. CODE § 33-11-8 (1992).
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2. Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.
During the 1970s, a number of cases throughout the country began
to raise the question of whether private litigants could maintain a
cause of action for an insurer's violation of the UTPA as adopted in
various states. In 1979, the California Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Cour t permitting third-party claimants to maintain direct actions against insurers
under California's version of the UTPA. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia soon followed suit with its decision in Jenkins
v. J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co.,' thereby becoming one of the
first jurisdictions to confront this issue.
Jenkins involved a claim by a plaintiff whose car had been damaged in a collision with another driver. The plaintiff sued the other
driver's liability insurer directly and sought to recover for the property
damages to the car, as well as for punitive damages and emotional
distress damages. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer had violated its
statutory duty under the UTPA by "not attempting in good faith to
effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims in which
liability has become reasonably clear."' The Circuit Court for Cabell
County dismissed the action on the ground that the statute could not
be construed to give rise to a private cause of action.2 4 On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled that the trial
court had erred.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Jenkins court found that thirdparty claimants, as well as insureds, were within the class of persons
protected by the language of the unfair claim settlement practices
provisions of the UTPA.26 The court then determined that an implied
private cause of action should be recognized for violation of these
provisions by an insurance company. The conclusions of the Jenkins
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9)(f) (1992).
Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255-57.
Id. at 258. Jenkins also held, however, that a direct suit against the insurer could
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court were expressly based not only on an analysis of West Virginia
law, but also on decisions from other jurisdictions.28 The court pointed out that, at the time of its decision, only two other cases had addressed the pertinent issues in any detail.29
3. Interpretation of the UTPA in Other Jurisdictions
In the years since 1981, many more states have considered these
issues. The overwhelming majority of these jurisdictions have concluded that no private cause of action should be recognized under the unfair claim settlement practice provisions of the UTPA .3 ° A number of
the reasons for this sharp reversal in the trend of decisions across the
nation were identified by the California Supreme Court in 1987, when

not be maintained until after the underlying civil action had been ultimately resolved and
accordingly affirmed the dismissal of the action against the insurer. Id. at 280.
28. Id. at 258 (noting decisions from Arizona, California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Washington).
29. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 256 (referring to Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979) and Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. Ct. App.
1979)).
30. E.g., O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 526-27
(Alaska 1988); Moradi-Shalal v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 59-60 (Cal. 1988);
Farmer's Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370, 1377-78 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), affd, 691
P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1984); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., No. CIV.A.88 C-MR233, 1993 WL 54504, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993); Greene v. Truck Ins. Exch., 753 P.2d
274, 279-80 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 776 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1989); Bates v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 467 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 1991); King v. Federal Ins. Co., 788 F.
Supp. 506, 507 (D. Kan. 1992), affd, 996 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1993) (construing Kansas
law); Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233, 235-38 (Minn. 1986);
Tufts v. Madesco Inv. Co., 524 F. Supp. 484, 487 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Gunny v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 830 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Nev. 1992); Pierzga v. Ohio Casualty Group, 504 A.2d 1200,
1204 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 517 A.2d 402 (N.J. 1986); Rocanova v.
Equitable Life Assunmce Soc'y, 634 N.E.2d 940, 944-45 (N.Y. 1994); Strack v. Westfield
Cos., 515 N.E.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); McWhirter v. Fire Ins. Exch. Inc.,
878 P.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Okla. 1994); Swinton v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 495, 49697 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309, 310
(Vt. 1981); A&E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 673-76 (4th
Cir. 1986) (construing Virginia law); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 307
N.W.2d 256, 266-69 (Wis. 1981). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763
S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1988); Klaudt v. Fink, 658 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (Mont. 1983).
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its decision in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos."
overruled Royal Globe.32
The California Supreme Court emphasized the adverse social and
economic consequences that the state had suffered as a result of its
earlier decision." The court cited reports indicating that Royal Globe
promoted multiple litigation thereby draining California's judicial resources.34 In the words of the California Supreme Court, the private
cause of action "contemplates, indeed encourages, two lawsuits by the
injured claimant: an initial lawsuit against the insured, followed by a
second suit against the insurer for bad faith refusal to settle. 35
Moradi-Shalal further pointed to reports that the implied statutory action encouraged unwarranted settlement demands by claimants and
coerced insurers to agree to inflated settlements in order to avoid the
cost of a second lawsuit and exposure to a bad faith action.36 These
consequences, according to the California Supreme Court, adversely
affected the general public in the form of escalating insurance costs as
insurers sought to recoup their increased expenditures on inflated settlements, jury awards in statutory actions, and added attorney fees.37

31. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1987).
32. Id. at 66.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 64-65. The intent of the framers of the model act,
together with the absence of any direct indication of a legislative intention to create a new
action, led the California Supreme Court to conclude that Royal Globe's statutory analysis
had also been faulty. The court criticized Royal Globe's assertion that the "savings clause"
of the California statute, which provided that administrative actions by the Insurance Commissioner for violation of the statute would not "relieve or absolve" an insurer from "'any
civil liability . .. under the laws of this State,"' demonstrated a legislative intention to
create a private cause of action. Id. at 61 (citation omitted). Instead, the Moradi-Shalal
court took the view that more direct and precise language would have been used if the legislature had intended to create a new action. The court also observed that NAIC, in formulating the model legislation, expressly rejected a provision that would have created a private
cause of action. Id. at 63-64.
Indeed, NAIC itself has emphasized that its "original intent" was to preclude such
actions because "[tihis Act is inherently inconsistent with a private cause of action." National Association of Insurance Commisioners, II Market Conduct and Consumer Affairs Subcommittee, 1990 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS 177 (1990);
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4. Practical Ramifications of Jenkins and Its Progeny
To date, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not
chosen to revisit its central ruling in Jenkins.38 Rather, during the first
half of the 1990s, the court addressed a variety of individual issues
stemming from the implied private cause of action created in Jenkins.
One recurring issue involved the timing for filing such actions. In
1991, the court was asked to clarify the meaning of Jenkins' statement
that actions for violation of the UTPA could not be maintained until
the underlying suit was "ultimately resolved."3 9 The court concluded
in Robinson v. Continental Casualty Co.4' that "ultimately resolved"
meant "resolved after any and all appeals" and held that the commencement of a statutory action was premature until the appellate
process had been completed in the underlying action. This pre-determination rule was reaffirmed in 1993. 4'
In 1994, however, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
announced that it was overruling Jenkins, Robinson, and other cases to
the extent that those decisions held that a statutory action could not be
joined in the same complaint as the underlying personal injury suit
against the insured.42 The court in State ex rel. State Farm v. Mad-

see 1990 Amendment, , supra note 16.
38. There are, however, some indications that West Virginia may be experiencing certain of the adverse economic consequences that were noted in California in the years following Royal Globe. Recently, the NAIC issued a nationwide study concerning average expenditures and premiums for personal automobile insurance between 1989 and 1993. NATIONAL Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, STATE AVERAGE ExPENDrruREs & PREMIUMS FOR PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE I[NSURANCE IN 1993 (1995). This report indicated that, during the period studied, the average premium for private passenger automobile liability insurance in West
Virginia increased by approximately 44 percent. Id. tbl. 4. This increase was more than
double the nationwide average increase of 21 percent during the same period. Id. Similarly,
West Virginia's average premium for private passenger automobile collision insurance likewise reportedly increased by approximately 20 percent during this period, as opposed to a
nationwide average increase of approximately 4 percent. Id. tbl. 5.
39. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 259.
40. 406 S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (W. Va. 1991).
41. Russell v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 532, 533-34 (W. Va. 1993).
42. State ex rel. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721, 725
(W. Va. 1994).
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den43 held that a party bringing a personal injury action against a

tortfeasor could also sue the tortfeasor's liability insurer for statutory
violations (including a failure to settle) prior to the time the claimant
had obtained a judgment against the alleged tortfeasor. However, the
court required that the claims made against the insurer be bifurcated
from those against the insured, and that any discovery or proceedings
against the insurer be stayed pending resolution of the underlying
claim against the insured.' The reason for this decision was the
court's concern that the filing fees associated with initiating the second
action were becoming "a more and more oppressive burden on ordinary working people."'4 5
In emphasizing this interest, the court may have inadvertently
threatened the traditional goals it has long espoused in its UTPA jurisprudence - encouraging settlements' and cutting the costs of litigation.47 For example, third-party claimants now routinely threaten and
file statutory bad faith claims against insurers while they are still pursuing claims against the alleged tortfeasor.' Prior to the resolution of
claims against the alleged tortfeasor, disputes about whether the
insured's liability is "reasonably clear" abound. However, once claims
of statutory bad faith are filed, these claims may be maintained as a
matter of course (as opposed to a matter of analysis) even after the
underlying action is resolved. Thus, permitting the filing of statutory
claims before resolution of the underlying claims against the tortfeasors
may well engender additional litigation.49

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at 258.
47. Madden, 451 S.E.2d at 725.
48. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Insurance Association, et al., at 11 n.14,
Poling v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 450 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1994) (No. 22135) (discussing
reports received from members of the Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia).
49. By allowing statutory claims against an insurer to be joined in the same complaint
as the underlying personal injury claims against the insured, Madden increases the chance
that the same attorney will represent the plaintiff on both claims. This situation entails potential problems because the conduct and evaluations of plaintiff's counsel are often at issue
in cases of alleged "bad faith" failure to settle cases. See, e.g., Zweig v. Safeco Ins. Co.,
509 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's ruling in Poling v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. unwittingly contributed to this result. In Poling, the court held that a statutory action
could go forward where the underlying action had been settled, even
though no judgment against the insured was obtained." The court
stated that:
[A] cause of action for insurance bad faith may arise even if there has
been a settlement and release so long as the release does not cover the
insurer and the insurer is, or should be, aware of the possibility of a bad
faith action at the time it agrees to the settlement. 2

Although the Poling decision was intended to protect claimants, it
has placed insurers and insureds in a dilemma where their interests
may not be aligned. After Poling, a careful insurer may insist on a.
release of any bad faith claims before settling a claim. However, insisting on such a release might delay or destroy a settlement. Because
the insured typically is only interested in resolving the claim against
him or her, the insured may see the insurer's refusal to settle as an act
Except in limited circumstances, an attorney who seeks to serve as both attorney
and witness in such cases will encounter ethical rules prohibiting this dual role. See WEST
ViRGn,nA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 cmt. (1995). If an attorney attempts
to resolve this conflict by remaining in the case solely as counsel, the client may be deprived of testimony necessary for the pending claim. If, on the other hand, an attorney
belatedly recognizes the conflict and withdraws as counsel in order to act as a witness, the
litigation is likely to be delayed and the plaintiff may incur added costs as a new attorney
becomes familiar with the matter. Madden thus encourages a conflict situation that cannot
be resolved without adverse consequences.
In addition, it should be noted that the bringing of a "bad faith" claim may waive
the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine with respect to the attorney's actions in the underlying suit. Courts have held that in suing an insurance carrier, plaintiffs
bring their own conduct and the conduct of their counsel in the underlying proceedings
directly into issue and insurers are entitled to inspect documents pertaining to the underlying
proceedings regardless of whether they contain attorney work product or communications
normally protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 136 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.C. 1990); see also Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Continental Casualty Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 477 (D. Colo. 1992); Charlotte
Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 130 (M.D.N.C. 1989);
Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
50. 450 S.E.2d 635 (W. Va. 1994).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 637.
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of bad faith even when the claimant's bad faith claims are wholly unfounded. 3 To avoid this dilemma, insurers may choose to litigate
questionable claims because a settlement will not conclude the litigation. Thus, in practice, a statute and court precedents that are designed
to reduce litigation costs, encourage the settlement of claims, and protect both the claimant and the insured may have the opposite effect of
encouraging further litigation between the parties and discouraging the
very settlement that could resolve those claims.54
Further practical ramifications of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia's UTPA decisions have become apparent in connection
with the requirement that plaintiffs prove that the insurer "commit[ted]
or perform[ed] [the unfair claim settlement practice] with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice."55 In Russell v.
Amerisure Insurance Co.,56 the court emphasized that more than a
single isolated violation of the unfair claim settlement practices statute
must be shown for the plaintiff to establish a general business practice.
The court found that alleged violations of five different subsections of
West Virginia Code Section 33-11-4(9) did not meet this requirement
because the factual basis for each violation was the same isolated scenario.
Although insurance commissioners are privy to information describing insurers' business practices, private litigants are not. Thus, litigants have sought to use the discovery process to develop information
sufficient to meet this statutory requirement. In State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stephens,58 the Supreme Court of Ap-

53. Cf ASHLEY, supra note 15, § 10.07, at 8-9.
54. Moreover, even in situations where the interests of the insurer and the insured are
aligned, the Poling rule carries the potential for depriving both parties of a major benefit of
settlement. When, pursuant to Poling, a settlement of the underlying action is followed by a
statutory action, the second action will require the claimant to establish that the insured's
liability was "reasonably clear" in the underlying action. Thus, one of the benefits of settling the underlying action - avoiding the need to litigate the insured's liability - is lost
by both the insurer and the insured. This circumstance appears likely to diminish the attractiveness of settlement.
55. W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(9) (1992).
56. 433 S.E.2d 532, 536 (W. Va. 1993).
57. Id.
58. 425 S.E.2d 577, 583-84 (WV.Va. 1992).
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peals of West Virginia addressed the permissible scope of discovery in
statutory causes of action and made clear that plaintiffs would not be
permitted to conduct unduly burdensome and oppressive discovery in
their effort to obtain evidence of an insurer's "general business practice." The court recognized that in a bad faith claim against a carrier,
previous "similar" acts are relevant to a bad faith claim, but refused to
allow interrogatories that requested the insurer to "provide information
on every claim filed against it, nationwide, since 1980 which involved
allegations of bad faith, unfair trade practice violations, excess verdict
liability or inquiries from insurance industry regulators concerning
State Farm's handling of claims."" The court limited discovery, at
least in the first instance, to "other similar claims filed against [the
insurer] in West Virginia. '
While the limitation imposed by Stephens appears sound and
workable, it too has engendered uncertainties. Insurers have been quick
to contend that other claims are factually distinguishable and claimants
have asserted that any claims involving the same insurer are "similar."
At trial, some courts have allowed other disgruntled claimants to testify about their experiences, which has resulted in trials within trials.6
Plaintiffs also have been permitted simply to introduce at trial records
of all bad faith claims filed against the insurer in West Virginia.62
The insurer is then permitted to explain each claim - a time consuming and ultimately non-probative exercise.
5. The Need for Clarification
A solution to these problems is not easily achieved. Nevertheless,
it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia may
wish to clarify its rulings and provide additional guidance on several
recurring issues in the application of the statute. Such guidance seems

59. Id. at 580.
60. Id. at 585.
61. See Petition for Appeal at 23-25, Quail Ridge Golf Club, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. (W. Va. 1993) ( No. 90-C-117) (describing admission at trial of testimony by thirdparty concerning previous bad experience with defendant insurer).
62. Id. at 12-23 (describing admission into evidence of 137 individual complaints filed
with West Virginia Insurance Commissioner against defendant insurer).
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especially appropriate in connection with the "general business practice" requirement. The court has taken a useful first step in Stephens
by indicating that evidence relevant to this element should involve
"similar" acts by the insurer in question.63 This issue could be further
clarified by a requirement that plaintiffs introduce evidence showing
that the insurer, when handling claims in West Virginia of the same
type as the plaintiff's claim and during the same time period as when
the plaintiff's claim was pending, regularly committed the same type
of statutory violation allegedly committed against the plaintiff. Clarification along these lines would not only reduce the drain on judicial resources from multiple trials within trials, but also might well encourage litigants to focus their discovery efforts and thereby reduce the
enormous litigation costs engendered by overbroad discovery.
The court may also reduce the unintended consequences of its
UTPA decisions by strictly enforcing the requirement that the conduct
at issue be performed with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice. Claims involving unique programs, such as retrospective premiums or large self-insured retentions where the insured controls the handling of the claims should not, by definition, be subject to
most of the Act's provisions.' By their nature, these programs are individually designed and the insurer's actions with respect to these programs are not probative when the claim involves a more typical insurance program. In addition, because the insurer lacks control over the
claims, it should not be held liable under the Act if the insured is
disinclined to settle a claim.

63. Stephens, 425 S.E.2d at 584.
64. Large corporate and private entities often purchase insurance with high deductibles
or large retentions that, practically speaking, make them self-insured for certain losses. Other
large insureds purchase policies that have retrospective premiums where an initial premium
is charged and then adjusted at the end of the policy year (and thereafter) to reflect the
actual loss experience of the business. These programs vary considerably and, in certain of

the programs, there is no risk transfer or none until a specified amount of loss is paid. Under many programs with retrospective premiums, large deductibles, or self-insured retentions,
the insurer handles claims for the policyholder, but the money that is spent is the insured's.
In these circumstances, the insured may have considerable control concerning what claims
are paid and in what amounts.
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Finally, the court may consider returning to its pre-Madden rule
regarding the timing of statutory actions. In Jenkins, Robinson, and
Russell, the court recognized that an important reason for delaying the
filing of the statutory action was that "once the underlying claim is
resolved, the claimant may be sufficiently satisfied with the result so
that there will be no desire to pursue the statutory claim."65 Similarly,
the court pointed out that "it is not until the underlying suit is concluded that the extent of reasonable damages in the statutory action
will be known."'
Although the court's concern with the burden of multiple filing
fees should not be minimized, alternative means might be used to address the problem. West Virginia law expressly provides for the waiver
of the filing fee (presently set at $70.00) if financial hardship to the
plaintiff would result.67 In addition, insureds and claimants who prevail under the statute will be reimbursed for these costs as a part of
their statutory fees.68 If the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia were to permit the circuit courts to exercise judiciously their
right to waive fees in appropriate cases, the court could once again
obtain the significant benefits that it has recognized as flowing from
its pre-determination rule. The court, therefore, could return to its wellreasoned analysis in Jenkins, Robinson, and Russell without imposing a
burden on indigent claimants.
B.

Third-Party Common Law Bad Faith

Historically speaking, the concept of common law bad faith first
emerged in the ihird-party insurance context.69 The classic fact pattern
giving rise to this concept occured where a plaintiff sued for damages

65. Russell, 433 S.E.2d at 534; Robinson, 406 S.E.2d at 471; Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at
259.
66. Russell, 433 S.E.2d at 534; Robinson, 406 S.E.2d at 471; Jenkins, 280 S.E.2d at
259.
67. See W. VA. CODE §§ 59-1-11, 59-2-1 (Supp. 1995); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 77(e).
68. See W. VA. CODE § 59-2-8 (1994).
69. See ASHLEY, supra note 15, § 1.02 (discussing early development of bad faith
law); ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LuABILrrY INSURANCE §§ 5A.02-03 (1995) (same).
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in an amount that exceeded the limits of a defendant's liability insurance policy.7 ° Under such liability policies, the insurer typically controlled the defense of the lawsuit and the decision whether to settle.
Thus, when the plaintiff proposed to settle for an amount at or slightly
below policy limits, a potential conflict arose because the insurer
would incur little or no additional risk by rejecting the plaintiff's proposal and proceeding to trial in hopes of obtaining a defense verdict.
The insured, on the other hand, would be exposed to significant additional liability if an unfavorable verdict in excess of the policy limits
were returned.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, courts across the
country began to develop caselaw placing on insurers the duty to consider a settlement in such circumstances.7 In cases where an insurer's
decision to proceed to trial was followed by an excess verdict, these
jurisdictions articulated a variety of standards for determining whether
the insurer's decision was improper and therefore subjected the insurer
to liability for the full amount of the judgment.72 Some jurisdictions
held that only good faith toward the insured was required in such
circumstances, while other jurisdictions required that both good faith
and ordinary care be exercised by the company in deciding not to
settle.73
The settlement-related tensions inherent in third-party liability insurance were recognized in West Virginia at an early date.74 The matter, however, remained unaddressed by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
As a result, commentators speculated on which of the various standards used in other jurisdictions would be chosen to govern in West
Virginia.' 5 The federal courts likewise attempted to discern the proba-

70. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
71. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1136, 1138-39 (1954).
72. See Id. at 1139-40 (surveying the emerging standards used in various states to
define the duty to settle).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., P.H. VARTANIAN, THE LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN VIRGINIA AND WEST

VIRGINIA, 415-16 (1928).
75. Richard Edwin Rowe, Comment, Insurance-Recovery of Excess Judgment from
Insurance Company, 70 W. VA. L. REV. 98, 103 (1967) (predicting that "it is most likely
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ble course of West Virginia law when called upon to decide cases that
76
involved the issue.
In 1966, the question was squarely presented to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Speicher v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.71 When the Speicher opinion was subsequently issued, however, it discussed at some length the bad faith and
negligence standards employed in other states, but resolved the case
without finding it necessary to adopt either of the competing standards. 78 This fundamental aspect of the law of insurance settlement
practices thereafter remained undecided in West Virginia for an additional twenty years.79
1. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
In early 1990, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
agreed to hear Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,8" in
which the Circuit Court of Kanawha County had allowed an insured to
recover from its liability insurer the full amount of a judgment in
excess of policy limits that had followed the insurer's failure to settle
the claims against the insured. In reaching this result, the trial court
had reviewed the insurer's conduct under a negligence standard.8 ' On
appeal, the insurer sought reversal on the ground that application of a
negligence standard was erroneous and that a bad faith standard was

that when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is confronted with the question they
will follow the majority and require that refusal to settle be a 'good faith' refusal").
76. Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.W. Va. 1957),
affd, 251 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1958).
77. 151 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1966).
78. Id. at 685-86, 689.
79. During this period, the federal courts continued to decide cases brought against
insurers for wrongfully failing to settle cases that resulted in excess verdicts against
insureds. See Daniels v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1970); Vencill
v. Continental Casualty Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.W. Va. 1977).
80. 396 S.E.2d 766, 773 (W. Va. 1990).
81. Id.
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appropriate. 2 The insured, on the other hand, argued on appeal that a
standard of strict liability should be applied."
When the court subsequently issued its opinion in Shamblin, it
emphasized that it was deciding an issue of first impression in West
Virginia and discussed at length the competing standards used by other
courts in determining whether an insurer had met its duty to its insured regarding the settlement of third-party claims.8 4 The court then
announced the "standard of proof.., applicable in future actions
against insurers by their insureds for failure to settle third-party liability claims against them within policy limits." 5 Shamblin adopted "a
hybrid negligence-strict liability standard" that followed the reasoning
of certain cases from other jurisdictions applying a negligence8 6 standard, but took "the concepts embodied therein one step further."
In specific terms, this new standard was based on the proposition
that an insurer would be deemed to have acted in prima facie bad
faith toward its insured whenever "there is a failure on the part of an
insurer to settle within policy limits where there exists the opportunity
to settle and where such settlement within limits would release the
insured from any and all personal liability."" In such circumstances,
the court held that the insurer would then have the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that it "attempted in good faith to
negotiate a settlement, that any failure to enter into a settlement where
the opportunity to do so existed was based on reasonable and substantial grounds, and that it accorded the interests and rights of the insured
at least as great a respect as its own."88 The Shamblin court further
provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether the insurer's conduct complied with this standard. 9

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 775.
86. Id. at 776.
87. Id. at 781.
88. Id.
89. The court set forth the following factors that must be considered:
1. Whether the reasonably prudent insurer would have refused to settle within policy limits under the facts and circumstances of the case, bearing in mind always its
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In this manner, Shamblin established a standard in the third-party
context that intentionally went "one step further" than the rules in
other jurisdictions." The court made clear that the source of these
settlement obligations was the insurer's "very strong obligation of good
faith to its insured" - a duty that was particularly important where a
liability insurer has control over settlement negotiations.9 '
2. Practical Ramifications of Shamblin
Because a relatively short period of time has elapsed since
Shamblin, the practical ramifications of the decision have not yet fully
emerged. One of the immediate consequences of Shamblin, however,
has been a degree of uncertainty over the standard to be applied in
excess verdict cases. As noted earlier, Shamblin expressly rejected a
pure strict liability standard in favor of a hybrid standard that permits

duty of good faith and fair dealing with its insured;
2. Whether there was an appropriate investigation and evaluation of the claim
based upon objective and cogent information;
3. Whether the insurer had a reasonable basis to conclude that there was a genuine and substantial issue as to liability of its insured; and
4. Whether there was a potential for substantial recovery of an excess verdict
against its insured.
Id. at 776. The court cautioned that this list was not to be considered exhaustive and that
any "salient fact or circumstance regarding the reasonableness of the insurer's actions, and
its concern or lack of concern for the protection of its insured, may be considered in determining whether the insurer is liable to its insured for any judgment obtained against him in
excess of policy limits." Id. at 777.
90. Various commentators have agreed with the court's assertion that the Shamblin
standard constituted a novel departure from existing approaches. See, e.g., ASHLEY, supra
note 15, § 3.22 (stating that "the West Virginia Supreme Court has come closer than any
to adopting strict liability in third-party cases"); JOHN C. MCCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FArrIH § 2.26 (5th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (stating that West Virginia "has
come close to adopting a strict liability standard for failure-to-settle cases, and has placed
an unusual burden of proof upon the insurer"); PAT MAGARICK, EXCESS LIABILITY: THE
LAW OF ExTRA-CONTRcruAL LIABILrrY OF INSURERS § 10.04 (3d ed. 1994) (describing
the Shamblin holding as "unusual").
91. Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 774-76 (discussing decision of Supreme Court of New
Hampshire in Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 56 A.2d 57 (N.H. 1947) and
adopting reasoning thereof); see also Weese, 879 F.2d at 120-21 (finding that insurer's duty
to its insured under third-party liability policy rested on insurer's exclusive reservation of
right to negotiate settlement).
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insurers to prevail if their settlement conduct was based on reasonable
and substantial grounds. 92 Nevertheless, in the years following the decision, one member of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
continued to speak in favor of applying a strict liability standard.93
Under these circumstances, some trial courts improperly imposed liability on insurers for excess judgments without holding any trial or hearing whatsoever concerning the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct.94

In the coming years, the West Virginia courts undoubtedly will
continue to be asked to apply the Shamblin standard to factual scenarios that, as the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has observed,
are "as varied and endless as the imagination."95 Thus, one of the
challenges facing the court will be to ensure that the standard established in Shamblin is implemented in a manner consistent with the
court's explicit rejection of a strict liability standard. The long-term
practical ramifications of9 6Shamblin will depend heavily on the court's
success in this endeavor.

92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. Charles, 452 S.E.2d at 389 (opinion by Justice Neely noting that his concurring
opinion in Shamblin indicated that he would go "even farther than the majority" and adopt
an "absolute liability standard"); Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 781 (Neely, J., concurring).
94. See Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 799; Charles, 452 S.E.2d at 388-89.
95. Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 776.
96. The practical ramifications of adopting a strict liability standard in the duty-tosettle context have been the subject of scholarly attention. See, e.g., Kent D. Syverud, The
Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. Rnv. 1113, 1168 (1990) [hereinafter Duty to Settle]. Commentators have found such a standard troubling because it would impose liability on insurers
even in cases where the plaintiff's settlement demand significantly exceeds the expected
judgment and any rational defendant would have rejected the demand. Id. at 1170. The
strict liability standard also has been criticized for its economic effects. Because such a
standard would effectively "cause[] liability limits to vanish if the plaintiff makes a demand
within the limits at any time in the litigation," commentators have concluded that insurers
would need to increase premiums in order to take into account the increased risks that
would accompany coverage. Id. at 1169; ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 7.8(b)(4), at 887-89 (1988). Premiums would increase further as insureds who
previously purchased high limits coverage switch to low limits coverage because of the
protection given to them by strict liability. See Duty to Settle, at 1170. Thus, under this
view, the net effect of adopting a strict liability standard would be "to increase the cost of
all policies while narrowing the price differential between low and high-limits coverage." Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 12

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

C. First-Party Common Law Bad Faith: Hayseeds, Inc. v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
Although some courts began to expand the concept of bad faith
from the third-party insurance context to the first-party context in the
early 1970s,9 7 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not
weigh in on this new area of bad faith law until 1986 when it issued
its opinion in Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty.98
In Hayseeds, the court considered a verdict entered in the Circuit
Court of Mason County against an insurer that had declined to pay a
property damage claim on the grounds of arson.99 In the trial court,
the jury found that arson had not been proven and the insureds were
awarded an amount under the policy for their property damages, as
well as additional amounts for attorneys' fees and consequential damages arising from the insurer's denial of their claim."°° On appeal,
the insurer argued, inter alia, that it should not be held liable for
extra-contractual damages because it had a reasonable basis for denying the insured's claim.'
The Hayseeds court noted that other jurisdictions had held that
when an insurer wrongfully withholds or unreasonably denies payment
of an insured's first-party insurance claim, the insurer was liable for
all foreseeable consequential damages naturally flowing from the delay. 2 The court criticized these other courts for basing their decisions on "judicial interpretation of such malleable and easily manipulated concepts as 'reasonable,' 'unreasonable,' 'wrongful,' 'good faith,'
and 'bad faith.""0 3 Instead, the court stressed the need for a clear,
bright-line standard governing the availability of consequential damages

97. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). See generally ASHLEY,
supra note 15, §§ 2.10 to .14 (discussing historical development of first-party "bad faith").
98. 352 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1986).
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id. at 76.
101. Id. at 80.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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in property damage insurance cases.'" 4 Accordingly, the court held
that "when a policyholder substantially prevails in a property damage
suit against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to damages for net
economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an award
for aggravation and inconvenience."" The court allowed attorney's
fees as a part of net economic loss, 6 but held that punitive damages
could only be awarded if the refusal to pay the claim was accompanied by a malicious intention to injure or defraud. 7
In the context of first-party bad faith, as in the area of third-party
bad faith, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia thus established a position that went beyond the approaches used in other jurisdictions' 8 and eliminated the role of bad faith in first-party property
insurance cases. This strict liability standard was based explicitly on
the nature of the relationship between an insurer and its insured.
"[W]hen an insured purchases a contract of insurance," the Hayseeds
court stated, "he buys insurance - not a lot of vexatious, time-consuming, expensive litigation with his insurer."'' 9

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The court held that attorney's fees are presumptively one-third of the face amount
of the policy. Id.
107. Id. at 80. The court noted that the high threshold of actual malice requires that
"the company actually knew that the policyholder's claim was proper, but willfully, maliciously and intentionally denied the claim." Id. at 80-81. The court specifically stated that it
intended this to be a "bright line standard, highly susceptible to summary judgment for the
defendant." Id. at 81.
108. Based on Hayseeds, West Virginia has been recognized as "the one jurisdiction to
adopt a strict liability standard in first-party cases." ASHLEY, supra note 15, § 5.03.
109. Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79. Although Hayseeds was decided in 1986, the practical
ramifications of the decision in West Virginia have not been well-documented. This situation
may be at least partially attributable to the fact that Hayseeds was, by its terms, limited to
property damage claims. Given the court's recent extension of Hayseeds to uninsuredlunderinsured motorist coverage and, by implication, all first-party claims, see infra,
Part Ill.D. (discussing Marshall v. Saseen and Hadorn v. Shea), the ramifications of the
decision may become more pronounced in the future.
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D. Hybrid Cases Involving Third-Party and/or First-PartyCommon
Law Bad Faith
By the early 1990s, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had adopted a strict liability standard for first-party bad faith
claims and a negligence-strict liability standard for third-party claims
where the insured was subjected to a judgment in excess of policy
limits. In 1994, the court was presented with a hybrid first/third-party
claim in the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage area. In Marshall v. Saseen"0 the tortfeasor defendant in a personal injury action
was defended at trial by the plaintiffs underinsured motorist carrier.
Prior to trial, the carrier rejected a policy limits settlement demand by
the plaintiff-insured. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in excess
of the policy limits."'
Thereafter, the trial court ruled that the insurer was guilty of bad faith as a matter of law and, without holding a
trial, entered judgment against the insurer for the excess judgment."
When the insurer challenged the trial court's actions on appeal, the
court issued rulings implicating both first-party and third-party bad
faith issues.
As an initial matter, the Marshall court addressed the applicability
of the Hayseeds doctrine in the context of uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance. This issue arose from the plaintiff's claim for attorney
fees and consequential damages allegedly incurred because the insurer
had refused to settle and the insured, therefore, had been forced to
proceed to trial."' The court noted that Hayseeds and its progeny involved insurance policies covering property damages, but stated that
"we can see no reason why these principles should not apply to uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.1 . 4 The court emphasized
that the critical point was that uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage, like property damage coverage, constituted first-party insur-

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

450 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1994).
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id.
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ance."' Under both types of insurance, the court reasoned, the insurer had directly contracted with the insured to provide coverage up to
the policy limits. 116 Therefore, the Marshall court held that:
[W]hen a policy holder of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage
issued pursuant to W. Va. Code 33-6-31(b) substantially prevails in a suit
involving such coverage under W. Va. Code 33-6-31(d), the insurer is
liable for the amount recovered up to the policy limits, the policyholder's
reasonable attorney fees, and damages proven for aggravation and inconvenience." 7

Although the court found that uninsured and underinsured motorist
coverage cases involved first-party coverage, the court also held that
the insurer was liable for amounts in excess of the policy limits under
the third-party doctrine announced in Shamblin."8 The court insisted
that, because the plaintiff's claim was based on the contention that the
insurer acted in bad faith in assessing the underlying tort action and
failing to settle within policy limits, the issues should be resolved "in
a manner substantively similar to any excess claim.. ' . 9
Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia applied
contract principles to hold the insurer liable for consequential damages
but did not apply the contract term setting forth the policy limits. Instead, the court applied third-party insurance bad faith law even though
the insurer did not insure the tortfeasor but, instead, contracted with
the injured party to provide coverage up to a specified amount if the
tortfeasor was uninsured or underinsured. The insurer was required to
pay the excess judgment even though it was not the insured who was
subjected to a judgment in excess of the policy limits he had purchased but rather a tortfeasor who had purchased no insurance. 20

115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id.; accord Morrison v. Haynes, 452 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1994).
117. Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 797; accord Morrison v. Haynes, 452 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va.
1994).
118. Marshall, 450 S.E.2d at 798.
119. Id.
120. The Marshall Court also ruled that the circuit court had erred by entering judgment against the insurer for the excess verdict without holding a second trial to determine
whether the insurer "was guilty of bad faith in failing to settle within its policy limits." Id.
at 799.
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Several months after the Marshall decision, the court in Hadorn v.
Shea' reaffirmed its holding concerning the application of Hayseeds
in the uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance context. The Hadorn
court also announced that Marshall had "by implication"
extended
22
Hayseeds to apply to all first-party insurance claims.

IV.

EFFORTS TO EXTEND WEST VIRGINIA'S LAW
OF INSURANCE BAD FAITH

As the foregoing demonstrates, West Virginia's law of insurance
bad faith has expanded dramatically in the last twenty years. Encouraged, perhaps, by these developments, plaintiffs across the state have
attempted to gain recognition for novel causes of action that, if accepted, would significantly extend the principles adopted by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia to date. In particular, efforts have
been made to create a new common law duty for insurers under thirdparty liability insurance policies. Third-party claimants have filed
claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing against the insurers providing liability coverage to tortfeasors.
To date, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has
made clear that it has never approved this cause of action by thirdparty claimants against liability insurers. In Charles v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"z the court pointed out that "no
one has yet suggested that the purpose of the Shamblin doctrine is to
protect victims." However, dicta in the Charles opinion suggests that
the "final contours" of West Virginia law have not yet been formed
and that the court might consider an extension of the Shamblin doctrine to third-party claimants. 24 Accordingly, the remainder of this

121. 456 S.E.2d 194 (W. Va. 1995).
122. Id. at 196.
123. 452 S.E.2d 384, 389 (W. Va. 1994).
124. Id. Although some third-party claimants have alleged claims of breach of fiduciary
duty against a tortfeasor's insurer, the court has not suggested that such a duty could be
owed by an insurer to a third-party claimant. Indeed, the court has stopped short of finding
that an insurer has a formal fiduciary duty to an insured. In Berry v. Nationwide Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., the court's opinion included a description of the insurer's duty as merely "analogous to that of a fiduciary." 381 S.E.2d 367, 373 n.6 (W. Va. 1989). It appears

that Berry's use of the word "analogous" was not accidental, but reflected that an insurer is
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Article examines whether this proposal finds support in the existing

law of West Virginia, whether an extension of West Virginia law
would be consistent with the decisions of other states when presented
with similar proposals, and whether such an extension would serve the
goals underlying the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's bad
faith jurisprudence.
A. West Virginia Caselaw Concerning the Scope of the Common Law
Duty of Liability Insurers
As suggested by Charles, existing West Virginia law provides no
support for the extension of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to
third-party claimants. In fact, the pertinent cases formulate the implied
covenant as existing only between the parties to the insurance contract.
As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated, every

insurance policy in West Virginia contains "an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which
will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."'" Likewise, the Shamblin opinion referred to an insurer's duty
not a true fiduciary as defined by West Virginia law. In West Virginia, "a person acts as a
fiduciary when the business he transacts, or the money or property he handles, is not for
his benefit but for the benefit of another to whom he stands in confidence." Koontz v.
Long, 384 S.E.2d 837, 839-40 (W. Va. 1989). An insurer, by contrast, is entitled to give
its own interests consideration equal to that it gives the interests of its insured. Berry, 381
S.E.2d at 373 n.6. This fact would seem to distinguish the duties of an insurer toward its
insured from those of a true fiduciary. West Virginia thus has not recognized a formal fiduciary duty between an insurer and its insureds, much less such a duty between an insurer
and third-party claimants.
Other jurisdictions have decisively rejected the notion of placing upon liability insurers a fiduciary duty to third-party claimants. Recently, for instance, the Texas Supreme
Court joined numerous other courts by concluding that creating such a duty would "necessarily compromise the duties the insurer owes their insured." Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth,
898 S.W.2d 269, 279 (Tex. 1995). The Texas court refused to require insurers "to perform
duties for third-party claimants that are 'coextensive and conflicting' with that due to their
own insureds." Id.; see also Dimitroff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 339
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that no fiduciary duty exists between liability insurer and
third-party claimant, even though claimant was also insured by same insurer under separate
policy).
125. Buckhannon-Upshur County Airport Auth. v. R & R Coal Contracting, Inc., 413
S.E.2d 404, 411 (W. Va. 1991) (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979))
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as running to its insured'26 and expressly described the rule announced therein as requiring "an aggressive good faith effort to settle
and protect its insured."'27 The court further stated that the Shamblin
rule would be applicable "in future actions against insurers by their
insureds8 for failure to settle third-party liability claims against
2
them.'
The clarity of West Virginia law concerning the scope of the
Shamblin duty was recognized in Charles, where the court observed
that it was "beyond cavil" that the Shamblin doctrine "was created to
protect policyholders who
purchase insurance to safeguard their hard129
estates.'
personal
won
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's limitation of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing to policyholders is consistent
with the theories underlying that duty. As Charles and Shamblin make
clear, the duty arises because an insured purchases a policy to obtain
protection from claims made by third parties. The insured typically
surrenders to the insurer the right to control the defense and settlement
of the litigation. In contrast, the third-party claimant has neither paid
the insurer for policy protection nor given up any control over the
litigation. Thus, the rationale for creating an implied covenant between
an insurer and its insured does not apply to the relationship between
an insurer and a third-party claimant - a stranger to the insurance
contract.
B. Decisions in Other Jurisdictions Concerning the Extension of the
Common Law Duty for the Benefit of Third-Party Claimants
Courts in other jurisdictions also have been asked to extend the
duty of good faith and fair dealing to third-party claimants. They have
overwhelmingly rejected such proposals. 3 ' Several reasons for this
(emphasis added).
126. Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 773-77.
127. Id. at 777 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
129. Charles, 452 S.E.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
130. See Hicks v. Alabama Pest Servs., Inc., 548 So. 2d 148, 150 (Ala. 1989); Ring v.
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rejection commonly have been advanced.
These courts have emphasized that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in every insurance policy emanates from the insurer's
obligation to act fairly in discharging its contractual responsibilities. 3 ' Thus, these courts have reasoned, the implied covenant does
Accordingly,
not exist when there is no contractual relationship.'
these courts have held that there is no doctrinal basis for holding an
insurer liable in tort to a third-party claimant as a stranger to the contractual relationship.'
In addition, courts frequently have warned of the great practical
difficulties that extending the implied covenant to third-party claimants

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 708 P.2d 457, 460-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Bell v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1305, 1308-09 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (construing
Arkansas and Oklahoma law); Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 718 P.2d 77, 83-84 (Cal. 1986);
Schnacker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 843 P.2d 102, 104-05 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992),
Messina v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 2, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying District of
Columbia law); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 211 S.E.2d 783, 785 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974);
Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co., 797 P.2d 81, 82 (Idaho 1990); Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
393 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667
(Ind. CL App. 1987); Long v. McAllister, 319 N.W.2d 256, 261-63 (Iowa 1982); Bell v.
Tilton, 674 P.2d 468, 477 (Kan. 1983); Linscott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368
A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Me. 1977); Bean v. Allstate Ins. Co., 403 A.2d 793, 795-96 (Md.
1979); Liimatta v. Lukkari, 460 N.W.2d 251, 252 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Nichols v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 318 F. Supp. 334, 335-38 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Santacruz v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., 650 F. Supp. 32, 33-34 (D. Nev. 1986); Duncan v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co., 23 A.2d 325, 326 (N.H. 1941); Murray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 507 A.2d
247, 250-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Browdy v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 289
N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); Dvorak v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508
N.W.2d 329, 331-32 (N.D. 1993); Murrell v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist., 634 N.E.2d
263, 265 (Ohio CL App. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 365 (Okla.
1984); Auclair v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 505 A.2d 431, 431 (R.I. 1986); Clark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 457 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tenn. CL App. 1970); Pixton v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 748-51 (Utah CL App. 1991); Tank v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1139-41 (Wash. 1986); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut.
Casualty Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 265 (Wis. 1981); Herrig v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487, 491-92
(Wyo. 1992). Contra Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla.
1971); State v. District Court, 703 P.2d 148, 158 (MonL 1985).
131. See, e.g., Dvorak, 508 N.W.2d at 331.
132. See, e.g., Messina, 998 F.2d at 5.
133. Id.; Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (D. Colo. 1994);
Schnacker, 843 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo Ct. App. 1992); Dvorak, 508 N.W.2d at 331.
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would create for liability insurers. Such courts have pointed out that
the interests of the insured and the third-party claimant are often in
conflict."' Accordingly, in the words of one court, "[w]hen faced
with this issue, courts simply refuse to place an insurer in the untenable position of owing a duty of good faith and fair dealing to both the
insured and the adversary of the insured."'35
C. Impact of Extending Shamblin to Third-Party Claimants Upon the
Goals of West Virginia's Bad Faith Jurisprudence
As the foregoing demonstrates, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia has consciously created common law rules in the areas
of first-party and third-party bad faith that are intended to ensure that
policyholders are not deprived of the benefits they purchased. In the
first-party context, the court has held that an insured who purchases a
policy "buys insurance - not a lot of vexatious, time consuming, expensive litigation with his insurer. ' Similarly, in the third-party
context, the court has insisted that policyholders "purchase insurance to
safeguard their hard-won personal estates" and should not "find these
estates needlessly at risk because of the intransigence of an insurance
carrier."'37 The court thus has consistently pursued the goal of ensuring that insurers observe a "very strong obligation of good faith to its
insured."' 38
An extension of Shamblin to third-party claimants would serve an
entirely different goal - to "protect" third-party claimants. Accordingly, one must ask whether such "protection" of third-party claimants is
a worthy goal and, if so, whether the extension of the common law
duty of good faith is the proper means of achieving this end. As discussed above, other jurisdictions have overwhelmingly answered both
of these questions in the negative. They have concluded that third-

134.
(Alaska
135.
136.
137.
138.

See, e.g., O.K. Lumber v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523, 525-26
1988).
Herrig, 844 P.2d at 491; see Galusha, 844 F. Supp. at 1404.
Hayseeds, 352 S.E.2d at 79.
Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 777.
Id. at 776.
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party claimants, who have not paid for the insurance coverage in question and have not given up their right to control the litigation and
settlement of their case, should not be granted rights against the liability insurer equal to those of the insured.'3 9 They also have held that
extending "protection" to third-party claimants by means of the implied
covenant is doctrinally insupportable."4 The reasoning of these jurisdictions appears equally applicable to West Virginia, particularly in
light of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's formulation
of the implied covenant as running between parties to the insurance
contract and its description of the duties that arise from the purchase
of insurance and the insurer's exclusive control over settlement negotiations on behalf of the insured.'4 1 Moreover, as discussed below, the
creation of the new cause of action would undermine key elements of
the jurisprudence developed over the last twenty years in two ways.
1. Such Extension Would Compromise
Policyholders

the Duty Owed to

The extension of Shamblin would clearly carry with it an immense
potential for harming the interests of policyholders. At first blush, it
might be assumed that simply extending the duty of good faith and
fair dealing to third-party claimants would not be a matter of concern
to insureds because the formal legal rights of insureds would not be
altered. This assumption, however, cannot withstand scrutiny. Once a
third-party claimant raises an allegation that the insured acted wrongfully and demands compensation, it is a simple fact that the interests
of the insured and the third-party claimant are likely to be in conflict.
Furthering the interest of one party therefore entails a real danger of
harming the interest of the other.
An insured, for example, may believe that the plaintiff's claims
are not warranted and may not want the case to be settled. Such a
policyholder may reasonably want the case defended vigorously and
may insist upon a "day in court" to vindicate his or her professional

139. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
140. Id.
141. See discussion supra Part V.A.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 12

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:267

or personal reputation.1 42 The third-party claimant, in contrast, may
demand a settlement within policy limits and may claim that his or her
interests would be injured if forced to proceed to trial. If an insurer
under these circumstances were to settle the case in consideration of
the interests of the third-party claimant, the insured might legitimately
claim that his or her reputational interests had been seriously compromised. 43
Similarly, even in cases where reputational interests are not directly implicated, the policyholder might well have strong interests in not
settling a claim that he or she believes is not warranted. These interests might arise from concerns about protecting his or her insurance
record and/or keeping insurance premiums low. Once again, settlement
in these circumstances in consideration of the interests of the thirdparty claimant would damage the interests of the policyholder.
Finally, even in circumstances where an insured favors settlement
of the case, the extension of Shamblin would create serious concerns.
The insured in these circumstances would have a reasonable interest in
settling the case for as little money as possible, so that the remaining
policy limits would not be unnecessarily exhausted and so that protection would still be available for other claims made against the insured.'" The third-party claimant, on the other hand, would have an

142. Indeed, the insured's strong interest in litigating certain cases has traditionally been
recognized in policies issued to doctors and other professionals. See ROWLAND H. LONG,
THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 12.05 (1985) (pointing out that most medical liability
insurance policies contain a requirement that the insured must consent to any settlement of
claims).
143. This situation would be further complicated in cases where the insured files a
counterclaim against the third-party claimant. The insurer's insistence on settlement in these
circumstances obviously would create significant difficulties with respect to the insured's
affirmative claims.
144. Depending on the type of coverage, policies can have both "per occurrence" and
"aggregate" limits. For policies written on an occurrence basis, the "occurrence limit" is the
"maximum amount that an insurance company is obligated to pay all insured parties seeking
recourse as a result of the occurrence of an event covered under a liability insurance policy." HARVEY W. RuBIN, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 284-85 (2d ed. 1991). The
"aggregate limit" is the "maximum dollar amount of coverage in force under a health insurance policy, a property damage policy, or a liability policy." Id. at 19. Once an insurer has
paid the amount of the aggregate limit, the insured no longer has any coverage under that
policy. If another claim arises that would otherwise be covered by that policy, the insured
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interest in settling the case for the greatest possible amount. The most
likely reconciliation of this conflict would be for the insurer to settle
the case at a level that compromises the interests of both parties. Thus,
even in the best of circumstances, the extension of Shamblin would
require insurers to compromise the interests of their insureds. Such a
result would be directly contrary to the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia's desire to encourage insurers to engage in aggressive
efforts to protect their insureds' interests. The extension of Shamblin
would thus undermine one of the central principles espoused in West
Virginia jurisprudence during the past two decades - that an insurer's
primary duty is to observe "a very strong obligation of good faith to
its insured."145
2. Such Extension Would Undermine the Cause of Action for
Statutory Bad Faith
It also appears that the statutory cause of action established by
Jenkins would be seriously affected by the extension of Shamblin.
Jenkins, as discussed earlier, held that the West Virginia Legislature
had created the statutory duty to settle for the benefit of third-party
claimants (as well as insureds) and that an implied private cause of
action was intended to enforce this duty."0 The court also held that
this legislation required plaintiffs to fulfill certain requirements, such as
47
proving a "general business practice," to prevail in such actions.
Creation of a Shamblin cause of action for third-party claimants would
permit them to sue for essentially the same conduct prohibited by the
unfair claim settlement practices statute, but would not require compliance with the various limitations that the Legislature has placed on
such actions and that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has emphasized over the last fifteen years. In effect, the extension of
Shamblin thus would circumvent the requirements recognized in
Jenkins and would render the statutory cause of action superfluous.

must pay
145.
146.
147.

the total amount of the loss.
Shamblin, 396 S.E.2d at 777.
See discussion supra Part llI.A.2.
Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, while West Virginia has, in many ways, led
the nation in protecting both insureds and claimants, during the last
twenty years, some of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia appear to have unexpectedly frustrated the very goals
the court sought to achieve. Accordingly, as the court reevaluates the
law of insurance bad faith in West Virginia, it should consider clarifying some of its opinions.
Moreover, the court should reject any attempt to extend the
insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing to third-party claimants.
There is no support for creating such a duty under West Virginia law
and proposals for the recognition of such a duty have been overwhelmingly rejected in other jurisdictions across the nation. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the extension of Shamblin to
third-party claimants would seriously threaten the central goals that the
court has pursued in its development of West Virginia's bad faith law
over the past two decades - to ensure that policyholders are not deprived of the benefits they purchased and that insurers observe an
obligation of good faith to their insureds.
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